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Governing and Deciding Who Governs
Josh Chafetzt

"Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other
objectives [than eradicating quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance], we have explained, impermissibly inject the
Government 'into the debate over who should govern.'
And those who govern should be the last people to help
decide who should govern."
-Chief Justice Roberts'
Election law 2 is centrally about the question of who governs.
Given the undeniable intuitive appeal of rules against selfdealing generally,3 it just seems obvious that self-dealing should
be all the more assiduously excluded from the election-law

t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This essay was prepared for The University
of Chicago Legal Forum's 2014 Symposium, "Does Election Law Serve the Electorate?" I
am grateful to the Symposium organizers and participants for their comments. Thanks
also to Will Baude, Joseph Blocher, Mike Dorf, Joey Fishkin, Aziz Huq, Marin Levy,
Jennifer Nou, David Pozen, Catherine Roach, Ben Rudofsky, Steve Sachs, Nick
Stephanopoulos, Jed Stiglitz, Franita Tolson, Justin Zaremby, and the participants in
the Cornell Law School Faculty Scholarship Retreat for helpful and thought-provoking
comments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own.
1 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441-42 (2014) (plurality
opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (internal citation omitted).
2 I use the phrase "election law" to refer broadly to laws governing candidate
eligibility, voter eligibility, access to polling places, campaign finance, campaign
communications, ballot counting procedures and standards, and so on. This broad
conception often goes by the name "The Law of Democracy." See Nathaniel Persily, In
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for JudicialAcquiescence to IncumbentProtecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REV. 649, 651 (2002) (describing "The Law of
Democracy" as the field encompassing the constitutional and statutory law of "voting
rights, redistricting, campaign finance, political parties, and regulation of the ballot").
See Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo ludex in Sua Causa: The Limits of
Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 387 (2012). Vermeule goes on to argue that, despite this
intuitive appeal, the hallowed principle of nemo iudex in sua causa "amounts to little
more than a banal counsel that impartiality is sometimes an important value in
institutional design" and therefore that "it is never sufficient to argue that a proposed
institution, or a proposed interpretation of ambiguous constitutional rules or practices,
would violate the nemo iudex principle." Id. at 389.
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context. After all, if the foxes should not be left to guard the
henhouse, then they certainly should not be put in charge of
galline security policy. Chief Justice Roberts' statement in
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,4 quoted above,
seems hard to dispute. And therein lies its insidiousness.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that, wherever
Roberts has gotten this standard-perhaps he has been reading
John Hart Ely? 5-it is not from a close reading of the
Constitution itself. After all, the Constitution makes each house
of Congress the final judge of the "Elections, Returns and
Qualifications" of its members, 6 and it allows each house to
expel members with a two-thirds vote.7 A bit more removed from
immediate self-interest-but still examples of "those who
govern" helping to decide "who should govern"-would be the
congressional impeachment power8 and congressional authority,
under certain circumstances, to determine the winner of
presidential and vice presidential elections. 9 And that's just
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion).
5

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

120 (1980) ("We cannot trust the ins to decide who stays out."); see also Luke P.
McLoughlin, The Elysian Foundationsof Election Law, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 89 (2009).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see also JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED
FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONS 162-92 (2007) (discussing the houses' exercise of this power); id. at 5557 (discussing the nonjusticiability of challenges to a house's judgment of the election,
return, or qualification of a member). Derek Muller goes even further-too far, in my
view-in suggesting that the Clause actually forecloses any state role in judging the
qualifications of congressional candidates. See Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal
Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559, 593-98 (2015).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 207-12, 214-22
(discussing each house's power to punish its members, including by expulsion); id. at 5759 (discussing the nonjusticiability of challenges to an expulsion).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6-7; id. art. II, § 4. On the nonjusticiability
of impeachment, see CHAFETZ, supra note 6, at 61-66.
9 At the very least, it is clear that, if no candidate receives a majority of the
electoral votes cast for president, then the House chooses the president (with each state
getting one vote); likewise, if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes cast
for vice president, then the winner is chosen by the Senate. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It is
more controversial whether Congress has a role in resolving disputes over the validity of
electoral votes. See id. ("[Tihe President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted."). The first time that such a controversy arose-the dispute over the Vermont
votes in the 1796 election-President of the Senate (and candidate for President of the
United States) John Adams appears to have given his Republican opponents an
opportunity to challenge the validity of the Vermont slate immediately after the vote
counts were announced and before Adams proclaimed himself the winner. The
Republicans passed on the opportunity. See Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas
Jefferson Counts Himself Into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 579-81 (2004). The
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assuming that the category of "those who govern" is limited to
members of Congress, the president, and the vice president.
And that brings us to the true danger in Roberts' claim: the
premise that the Court stands outside of, and indeed above, the
structures and processes of governance. In the two sentences
quoted above, Roberts makes use of two distinct but interrelated
rhetorical strategies to distance his own institution from the act
of governing. First, his use of the first-person plural ("we have
explained") posits a trans-temporal unified identity for the
Court, which is implicitly contrasted with the shifts and
vagaries of mere electoral politics. Second, Roberts' implicit
contrasting of the Court with "those who govern" serves to
suggest that the Court is somehow removed from the arena of
partisan politics. This essay will interrogate both of these
distancing strategies.
Part I will look at the Court's self-presentation-its "we"by contrasting its understanding of judicial corruption in
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal CompanyO with its understanding
of electoral corruption in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission" and McCutcheon. Part II will consider the Court's
implicit claim that it does not "govern," using Bush v. Gore,12
Shelby County v. Holder,13 and election-law disputes
surrounding the 2014 midterms to ask to what extent the Court
is, in fact, removed from the realm of partisan politics when
deciding election-law cases.

Electoral Count Act, first enacted in 1887, allows the two houses, acting separately, to
resolve electoral disputes. Electoral Count Act, ch. 90, § 4, 24 Stat. 373, 373-74 (1887)
(codified at 3 U.S.C. § 15). By 1925, Charles Tansill noted that, "At present,
Congressional control [over the counting of electoral votes] is so firmly established that
only a few students of the subject are interested in, or comprehend, the process of its
evolution." C.C. Tansill, Congressional Control of the ElectoralSystem, 34 YALE L.J. 511,
511 (1925). Nonetheless, John Harrison has argued that Congress has no authority to
determine the validity of electoral votes-indeed, he argued that the Constitution does
not vest any institution with such authority. John Harrison, Nobody for President, 16
J.L. & POL. 699 (2000). Vasan Kesavan, by contrast, argues that Congress does have
such authority, although he thinks that the Electoral Count Act is constitutionally
invalid on other grounds. Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1723-29 (2002). Regardless of who has the better of these
arguments, it is clear that, at least sometimes, those who govern (in Congress) will help
decide who should govern (in the presidency and vice presidency).
1e 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
11 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
12 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
13 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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"WE"

McCutcheon struck down the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971's limits on the aggregate amount that a donor could
contribute to all federal candidates and political committees in a
given election cycle. 14 These limits supervened upon the base
limits-the limits on how much a donor could give to any
particular candidate or committee, which were upheld in
Buckley v. Valeo 15-so that donors were prevented from giving
the otherwise-legal full amount under the base limits to more
than a handful of candidates. 16 Roberts, writing for a plurality,
argued that "the aggregate limits do little, if anything, to
address" the government's "permissible objective of combatting
corruption," while at the same time they "seriously restrict[
participation in the democratic process."1 7
In the course of reaching this conclusion, Roberts made two
key moves regarding the government's interest in campaign
finance regulation, one older and one newer. The older move,
finding its origins in Buckley," was the insistence that
''preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption" is the
only permissible interest that the government may pursue
through such legislation.1 9 The newer move was Roberts'
assertion that "Congress may target only a specific type of
corruption-'quid pro quo' corruption .... [T]he Government
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
not involve any challenge to the base limits, which we
the permissible objective of combatting corruption.");
1, 20-35 (1976) (per curiam).
to two handfuls. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448
("To put it in the simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully
contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates,
even if all contributions fall within the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect
against corruption.").
14

Id. at 1442 ("This case does
have previously upheld as serving
see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
16 To be precise, it was closer
15

"

Id. at 1442.

In Buckley, the government asserted three interests justifying the campaign
finance regulations at issue: (1) that they prevented corruption and the appearance of
corruption; (2) that they equalized the ability of citizens to affect electoral outcomes; and
(3) that, by reducing the cost of political campaigns, they opened the political system to a
wider array of candidates. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26. The Court accepted the first of
these rationales as legitimate, id. at 26-29, while rejecting the other two. Id. at 48-49,
57. See also Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 135 (2004) ("[T]he
central justification for campaign finance regulation had been limited, since Buckley, to
regulating campaign contributions for the purpose of avoiding corruption or, more
nebulously, the appearance of corruption.").
19
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450.
1
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may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or
access." 20 This quid pro quo-only conception of corruption was
the lynchpin of the plurality opinion; as Justice Breyer argued in
dissent, the claim "that large aggregate contributions do not
'give rise' to 'corruption' . . . is plausible only because the
plurality defines 'corruption' too narrowly." 21 This narrow
conception of corruption had come a long way in just over a
decade: it was first advanced by Justice Kennedy in dissent in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 22 and then (after
some crucial turnover in Court personnel) made its way into the
Court's decision in Citizens United.23 Justice Kennedy, who
wrote for the Court in Citizens United, quoted extensively from
his own McConnell dissent, relying on it to reject an anticorruption rationale for the provision of the 2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act that prohibited corporations and unions
from using their general treasury funds for electioneering
communications. As Kennedy formulated the principle in
Citizens United:
When Buckley identified a sufficiently important
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to
quid pro quo corruption. The fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean
that these officials are corrupt . . . . Reliance on a "generic
favoritism or influence theory . .. is at odds with

standard First Amendment analyses because it is
unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle." 24
Clearly, the Court has thrown its weight behind the notion that
corruption-the only thing that campaign finance restrictions
can be used to attack-means either the appearance or the

2o
21

Id. at 1450-51.
Id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("Though the majority cites
common sense as the foundation for its definition of corruption, in the context of the real
world only a single definition of corruption has been found to identify political corruption
successfully and to distinguish good political responsiveness from bad-that is quid pro
quo.") (internal citation omitted).
23 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
24
Id. (internal citations, including three to Kennedy's McConnell dissent, omitted).
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actuality of quid pro quo interactions, "a direct exchange of an
official act for money," 25 and nothing more. 26
Except, of course, when it means more. Caperton, which was
argued three weeks before Citizens United (and decided a little
over seven months before Citizens United27), has a rather more
expansive understanding of corruption-at least, when the
alleged corruption at issue is judicial. After the A.T. Massey
Coal Company lost a tort suit in West Virginia, its chairman,
Don Blankenship, spent huge amounts of money (almost
entirely in the form of independent expenditures and
contributions to a 527 organization 28) in support of Brent
Benjamin, a candidate for the state supreme court. 29 Benjamin
narrowly won and then sat on the court as it twice (the second
time on rehearing) reversed the jury verdict against Massey,
both times by a three-to-two vote. 30 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the West Virginia Supreme Court, holding that
Benjamin's failure to recuse himself was a due process
violation. 31 Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court-and, indeed,
he was the only justice in the majority in both Caperton and
Citizens United.32 Kennedy noted that "[n]ot every campaign
contribution by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of
bias that requires a judge's recusal, but this is an exceptional
case." 3 3 (It is worth pausing to note that Kennedy's casual
reference to independent expenditures and donations to 527
groups as a "campaign contribution" is itself in significant

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 31
(2012) ("Citizens United suddenly eliminated any discretion for courts and Congress to
recognize a realistic risk of corruption from independent expenditures or electioneering
communications."); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101
VA. L. REV. 1425, 1427 & n. 13 (2015) (noting that "the Supreme Court has recently
narrowed the definition of corruption to quid pro quo exchanges," citing McCutcheon and
Citizens United).
27 Citizens United was originally argued in the 2008 Term; it was then re-argued
and decided in the 2009 Term. Compare Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868
(2009), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
" For a description of 527 organizations, see Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem ...
and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 955-69 (2005).
29 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872-76.
25

26

so

Id.

Id. at 886-90.
Compare Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (2009), with Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
33 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
31

32

GOVERNING AND DECIDING WHo GOVERNS

73]

79

tension with Citizens United.34) The sheer magnitude of
Blankenship's "contributions," dwarfing all other spending
relating to the race, was what made this case exceptional.
Kennedy concluded that, even though "there [was] no allegation
of a quid pro quo agreement" between Blankenship and
Benjamin, 35 "there is a serious risk of actual bias . . . when a
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge
on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election
campaign when the case was pending or imminent." 36
Importantly, whether the "campaign contributions were a
necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin's victory is not the
proper inquiry." 37 Rather, the "risk" that the spending
"engendered actual bias is sufficiently substantial" that due
process required Benjamin's recusal. 38
The root word "corrupt" is used only once in Caperton, and
that is in a quotation from FederalistNo. 10.39 And yet clearly
this is a case about corruption: the "risk" of which Kennedy
writes can only be the risk that Justice Benjamin will rule
differently, having benefitted from the spending, than he would
have had he not so benefitted. 40 Importantly, Kennedy seeks no

3
Citizens United flatly held that "independent expenditures ... do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption." Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). James Sample has called attention to this passage in Caperton
and coined the term "Capertoncontribution" to describe "the equation of independent
expenditures with contributions in the judicial elections context." James Sample,
Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and
Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 727, 756 (2011). See also Pamela S. Karlan, The
Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Foreword:Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36
n. 207 (2012) ("Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court 'repeatedly refers to the
exceptional or "extraordinary" nature' of Massey CEO Don Blankenship's 'campaign
contributions.' But Blankenship had contributed only $1000, the statutory maximum, to
the jurist's campaign committee. What was extraordinary was the $500,000 he spent on
direct mailings, letters seeking donations from others, and advertisements, and the
nearly $2.5 million he contributed to a political organization [supporting Benjamin].")
(internal citations omitted).
3 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886.
3

Id. at 884.

3

Id. at 885.

38

Id.

9 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (noting "the maxim that '[n]o man is allowed to be a
judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity."') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
40
One might be tempted to read Caperton even more expansively, and say that the
"risk" is the likelihood of systemic bias-that is to say, that even were we certain that
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evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement: the sheer amount of
money that Blankenship spent supporting Benjamin corrupted
the process of justice to the extent that Benjamin could not sit
on the case. 41 As Laura Underkuffler has suggested, Caperton
advances "the idea that we cannot trust-indeed, cannot afford
to trust-individuals such as Benjamin to act noncorruptly,
whatever assurances they give and whatever the lack of
evidence of instances of quid pro quo corruption there
might be." 4 2

In a single paragraph in Citizens United, Kennedy
attempted to distinguish Caperton, insisting that, "The remedy
of recusal was based on a litigant's due process right to a fair
trial before an unbiased judge. Caperton's holding was limited to
the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's
political speech could be banned." 43 This is, of course, true:
Caperton and Citizens United arise in different doctrinal areas.
But it also wholly elides the fact that both opinions rely heavily
on conceptions of corruption, and those conceptions are very
different from one another. 44
Indeed, the Caperton conception of corruption was again on
display in the 2015 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar decision, 45
which did involve the banning of political speech. Specifically,
the Court held that a state could forbid candidates for judicial
Justice Benjamin's motives were pure as the driven snow, the relevant risk is that the
case would have come out differently but for Blankenship's spending because, say,
Benjamin's opponent would have won the seat. But if this were the risk that Kennedy
had in mind, then the remedy is woefully inadequate. After all, "West Virginia Supreme
Court minus Justice Blankenship" is a very different body than "West Virginia Supreme
Court plus Justice Blankenship's opponent." If the risk of systemic bias gave rise to a
due process violation, then the Court would have to forbid, or at least heavily regulate,
judicial elections.
41 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886.
42

LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, CAPTURED BY EVIL: THE IDEA OF CORRUPTION IN LAW

218-19 (2013).
4
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (internal
citation omitted).
4I
am hardly the first to notice this tension between Caperton and Citizens United.
See, e.g., id. at 458-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and
the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 584, 612-15 (2011); Kang, supra note
26, at 45-47, 56-57; Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United,
Caperton, and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 MONT. L. REV. 25, 41-42, 49, 54-58
(2012); Ryan Rodoni, The New First Amendment: Allowing Unlimited CorporateElection
Speech Free from Response, 34 U. HAW. L. REV. 263, 290 (2012); Robert Weissman, Let
the People Speak: The Case for a ConstitutionalAmendment to Remove Corporate Speech
from the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 979, 989-90 (2011).
45 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
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office from personally soliciting campaign contributions.
Departing from the principle that only the prevention of quid
pro quo corruption or its appearance could justify campaign
finance restrictions, Chief Justice Roberts, for the Court, wrote
that "public perception of judicial integrity is 'a state interest of
the highest order."' 46 Because judges are "charged with
exercising strict neutrality and independence, [they] cannot
supplicate campaign donors without diminishing public
confidence in judicial integrity," a principle that Roberts traced
back to Magna Carta.47 In other words, judicial integrity is
compromised by a system in which donors appear to purchase
influence or access-precisely the types of interaction that
Citizens United held to be non-corrupt and therefore beyond the
permissible reach of campaign finance law. The Court
accordingly upheld a restriction on the electoral speech of
judicial candidates that it would certainly have struck down if
applied to candidates for executive or legislative office. 48 In
short, solicitation of campaign funds corrupts the judicial
process-or at least creates a public appearance of corruption
justifying state regulation-but it does not so corrupt executive
or legislative processes.
I submit that the best explanation for the Court's
differential conceptions of corruption is a return to the firstperson plural, the "we" who "have explained" how "those who
govern" may regulate the electoral process. "We," in the
judiciary, stand apart; we must therefore hold ourselves to
higher standards than mere elected politicians. The selfperception of high ethical standards can be a significant source
of judges' self-esteem; the public perception of high ethical
standards can be a significant source of institutional power and
prestige. 49 The Court's self-presentation as unique in this regard
Id. at 1666 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889); see also id. at 1667 (suggesting
that "no one denies" that "public confidence in judicial integrity" is a "genuine and
compelling" interest).
4 Id. at 1666. But see Jess Bravin, Magna Carta'sBirthday, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
2014, at B5 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts, in a speech at the Library of Congress, as
saying that, "If you're citing Magna Carta in a brief before the Supreme Court of the
United States, or in an argument, you're in pretty bad shape.. . . We like our authorities
a little more current.").
48 See Williams- Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667, 1672 (holding that states have compelling
interests in regulating judicial elections more stringently than elections to other offices);
id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (same).
4 I have previously made this point in the context of congressional
ethics. See Josh
46
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thus stands to redound significantly to its benefit. This judicial
self-perception and self-presentation can be thought of as having
three central components: the judiciary is eternal; it is passive;
and it exercises maturity of judgment. By contrast, electoral
politics is figured as transient, grasping, and capricious. We can
see each of these components emerging from the cases already
discussed.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that this firstperson plural deliberately masks a first-person singular: as
noted above, only Justice Kennedy is in the majority in both
Caperton and Citizens United (and only Chief Justice Roberts is
in the majority in both Williams-Yulee and Citizens United).
There is, of course, nothing necessary about a collegial court
speaking univocally: the United States Supreme Court issued
seriatim opinions for its first decade, and the United Kingdom
Supreme Court has only recently begun moving away from the
practice.5 0 An institution's own rules and practices give us the
means by which to interpret that institution's behavior.5 1 In
essence, by choosing to speak as a "we," the justices call this
"we" into being and make it sensible to speak of "the Court" as
an entity that "says" or "decides" things. According to the
justices' own practices, the "we" of Caperton and Williams- Yulee
is the same as the "we" of Citizens United.
It is this move from the individual to the super-individual
level that allows the Court to present itself as eternal. Just as
Theseus' ship can maintain a stable identity even as its planks
are all gradually replaced, so too can the Court, in its own selfpresentation, remain the same even as its composition changes.
In the McCutcheon quotation with which this essay opened,

Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 754-61 (2012); see also JOSH
CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF

POWERS ch. 8 (book manuscript under contract with Yale Univ. Press) [hereinafter
CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY].

so See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory
of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292-325. On the recent shift in British practice, see
ROSA RAFFAELLI, DISSENTING OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE MEMBER

STATES 29 (2012), available at http: //www.europarl.europa.euldocument/activities/
cont/201304/20130423ATT64963/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/C937-V4E9 ("The [U.K.] Supreme Court follows the tradition of seriatim
decisions .... Yet, there appears to be some evidence of a new trend towards issuing
single judgments, or single majority judgments.").
51 In this, I am influenced by Victoria Nourse's discussion of "rule-based decision
theory." See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 89-90 (2012).
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Roberts used "we" to refer to a case decided three years earlier.
But the first-person plural cuts a much wider swath: the first
citation of the opinion, following the sentence, "Our cases have
held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to
protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption," is to
Buckley v. Valeo, a case decided the year that John Roberts
graduated from college. 52 Indeed, Roberts is insistent that the
unitary Court has been consistently devoted to these principles
for far longer than any currently-serving justice has been on
the Court:
In a series of cases over the past 40 years, we have
spelled out how to draw the constitutional line between
the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political
process and the impermissible desire simply to limit
political speech. We have said that government
regulation may not target the general gratitude a
candidate may feel toward those who support him or his
allies, or the political access such support may afford.
"Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption."53
The quotation at the end of that passage (indeed, the only
citation Roberts offers to substantiate his "forty years" claim) is
from Citizens United. That passage in Citizens United, in turn,
cites to the McConnell majority opinion 54-which requires some
creative reading, to say the least. Indeed, one of the very pages
of McConnell cited in the passage in Citizens United to which
the passage in McCutcheon refers contains the following:
[P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases
have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest
simple cash-for-votes
extends beyond preventing
corruption to curbing "undue influence on an
officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such

52 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam)). Buckley was decided on
January 30, 1976. John Roberts graduated Harvard College in 1976. See Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges: Roberts, John Glover Jr., FED. JUD. CENTER, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsflhisj, archived at http://perma.cc/FE78-PMK2.
1 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)) (ellipsis in original).
1
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360-61 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
540 U.S. 93, 125, 130-31, 146-52 (2003)).
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influence." Many of the "deeply disturbing examples" of
corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to justify [the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's] contribution
limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that
various corporate interests had given substantial
donations to gain access to high-level government
officials. Even if that access did not secure actual
influence, it certainly gave the "appearance of such
influence."5 5
These two passages from McCutcheon and McConnell say
diametrically opposed things, yet both are deeply invested in the
notion that the decision that "we" reach today is consistent with
"our cases" from the past. Indeed, so invested in this notion is
the Court that the first passage above cites a decision citing the
second one, without any seeming irony. Apparently, we have
always been at war with the notion of access as corruption. 56
Of course, this trans-temporal "we" is by no means limited
to election-law cases. Alison LaCroix has noted that, despite
"changes in membership and doctrine," the Court's insistence on
using the first-person plural "suppress[es] . . . multiplicity and
discontinuity in favor of a posture of unitariness and
continuity."5 7 In other words, "[t]he Court's institutional selfpresentation suggests that it is immortal and therefore not
temporally bound."5 8 By contrast, consider the ways in which the
concept of transience suffuses the Court's discussion of electoral
politics. It is full of unappealing "television commercials touting
a candidate's accomplishments or disparaging an opponent's
character." 59 (Of course, Justice Scalia suspects that, even if
viewers dislike these commercials, "they detest even more hourlong campaign-debate
interruptions
of their
favorite
entertainment programming."6 0 How fortunate for us all, then,
that the Court refuses to allow its hour-long oral arguments to

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 157 (Plume 2003) (1949) ("It was true that [Julia]
regarded the whole war as a sham; but apparently she had not even noticed that the
name of the enemy had changed. 'I thought we'd always been at war with Eurasia,' she
said vaguely. It frightened him a little.").
5
Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (2010).
5 Id. at 1332.
5 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
6
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 261 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
5
5

GOVERNING AND DECIDING WHO GOVERNS

73]

85

be televised.6 1 ) Faddish "entertainers" like Beyonc6, Jay-Z, and
Kid Rock raise money for candidates. 62 Candidates peddle
"sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that
dominate the 24-hour news cycle," 63 even though it is "well

known" that the fickle "public begins to concentrate on elections
only in the weeks immediately before they are held."6 4 How
different is the eternal Court, which knows nothing of Jay-Z 65

and speaks in tomes, rather than sound bites.
Second, the Court differentiates itself through its passivity.
It does not wish to involve itself in the affairs of the world, but it
sometimes becomes its "unsought responsibility to resolve" the
issues that it has "been forced to confront." 66 Consider again
McCutcheon, where, in response to Justice Breyer's suggestion
that the Court remand for the development of an evidentiary
record, the Chief Justice wrote, "We take the case as it comes to
us."6 7 Of course, the Court is not always so retiring: in Citizens
United, it ordered re-argument and re-briefing when it did not
like how the case came to it.68 But the Court's rhetoric of
passivity projects a Cincinnatian air, in contrast to electoral
politics, which is figured as striving and grasping, and therefore
dangerous. "The first instinct of power is the retention of power,
and, under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that
is best achieved by the suppression of election-time speech,"

For the most trenchant recent critique of this practice, see Last Week Tonight
with John Oliver, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Supreme Court (HBO), YOUTUBE
(Oct. 19, 2014), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-fJ9prhPV2PI, archived at
http://perma.cc/J76L-LR2E.
61 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 & n. 5.
63 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 364
(2010).
6'

Id. at 334.
See, e.g., Paige Lavender, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Owns Her 'Notorious'Nickname,
HUFFINGTON POST, July 31, 2014, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
archived at http: /perma.cc/SW7Z-3838
2014/07/31/notorious-rbgn5638254.html,
(reporting that Justice Ginsburg's clerks had to explain the "Notorious RBG" meme to
her). For a brilliant recent attempt to educate the Court in the ways of hip-hop, see Brief
for the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap Music Scholars as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13983), 2015 LEXIS 3719.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
6
67 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 n. 4.
6
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 557 U.S. 932 (2009); see also Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 398 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("Essentially, five Justices were unhappy
with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves
an opportunity to change the law.").
6
65
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writes (the apparently powerless) Justice Scalia. 69 There is a
real risk that those in power-meaning elected officials and
their underlings-will not only suppress electoral speech but
also use their "authority, influence, and power to threaten
corporations to support the Government's policies."70 How
different from the Court, which never reaches out to "suppress"
or "threaten," but simply waits patiently at One First Street,
taking cases as they come.
Finally, the Court presents itself as exercising maturity of
judgment. In Caperton, Justice Kennedy portrayed the judicial
role thus:
The judge inquires into reasons that seem to be leading
to a particular result. Precedent and stare decisis and
the text and purpose of the law and the Constitution;
logic and scholarship and experience and common sense;
and fairness and disinterest and neutrality are among
the factors at work. To bring coherence to the process,
and to seek respect for the resulting judgment, judges
often explain the reasons for their conclusions and
rulings.71
This displays a healthy amount of institutional self-regard.
Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising that the justices tend to take
on a tone of parental condescension, as evidenced by one of their
favorite phrases: "we have explained." 72 Electoral politics, by

6

J.).

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (opinion of Scalia,

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009).
72
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015) ("As we have
explained, noncommercial solicitation 'is characteristically intertwined with informative
and perhaps persuasive speech."') (internal citation omitted); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at
1441 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("Campaign finance restrictions that pursue
other objectives, we have explained, impermissibly inject the Government 'into the
debate over who should govern."') (internal citation omitted); id. at 1448 ("As the Court
explained [in Buckley], the 'overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction
upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate
himself by means of financial support."') (internal citation omitted); id. at 1458 ("As we
have explained, 'restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements."') (internal citation
omitted); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324-25 ("As explained by the Chief Justice's
controlling opinion in WRTL, the functional-equivalent test is objective: 'a court should
find that [a communication] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against
a specific candidate."') (internal citation omitted); id. at 345 ("The Buckley Court
70
71
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and parental
contrast, is deserving of condescension
supervision. 73 Whereas judicial speech-acts should be held to
high standards-those of "logic and scholarship and experience
and common sense," in Kennedy's words 74-electoral speech is
undiscriminating. It is just as likely to be false or worthless as it
is to be true or valuable, so all we can do is trust to the
marketplace of ideas: "Factions should be checked by permitting
them all to speak, and by entrusting the people to judge what is
true and what is false." 75 There is no room in electoral politics

for an authoritative voice that might "explain" how things really
are. To anyone who doubts the efficiency of the unregulated
marketplace of ideas, 76 the justices fall back on their authority
in other First Amendment contexts: "If the First Amendment
protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi paradesdespite the profound offense such spectacles cause-it surely
protects political campaign speech despite popular opposition."77
Say what you want about the tenets put forth in "30-second
television ads,"7 8 at least they're better than Nazi parades!79
The justices' dim view of electoral politics comes through in
other contexts, as well. Consider Roberts' annual reports on the
state of the federal judiciary. In 2012, he chastised the elected
branches for what he perceived to be their fiscal irresponsibility:

explained that the potential for quid pro quo corruption distinguished direct
contributions to candidates from independent expenditures."); id. at 367 ("In Buckley,
the Court explained that disclosure could be justified based on a governmental interest
in 'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of election-related
spending.") (internal citation omitted); id. at 369 ("The Court has explained that
disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.");
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204 ("As we explained in Beaumont. . .. "); id. at 221 ("We
explained in Buckley .... ).
1 In an elegant essay predating many of the cases discussed here, Rick Pildes noted
that a majority of the justices appear to subscribe to a "cultural" view that electoral
politics is so messy and disordered as to pose a threat to the polity itself, thereby
requiring judicial supervision. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 695 (2001).
74 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883.
7 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355 (internal citation omitted).
76 For trenchant criticism along just those lines, see Joseph Blocher, Institutions in
the Marketplaceof Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 829-38 (2008).
77 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
78 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.
7 Cf. THE BIG LEBOWSKI (Polygram Filmed Entertainment & Working Title Films
1998) ("[S]ay what you want about the tenets of National Socialism, Dude, at least it's an
ethos.").
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[O]ur country faces new challenges, including the much
publicized "fiscal cliff' and the longer term problem of a
truly extravagant and burgeoning national debt. No one
seriously doubts that the country's fiscal ledger has gone
awry. The public properly looks to its elected officials to
craft a solution. We in the Judiciary stand outside the
political arena, but we can continue to do our part to
address the financial challenges within our sphere.80
The following year, he made the same point, drawing an even
starker contrast between the responsibility of his own branch
and the fecklessness of the others:
We in the Judiciary recognize what should be clear to all:
The Nation needs a balanced financial ledger to remain
strong at home and abroad..

.

. We began our cost-

containment efforts nearly a decade ago, long before the
talk of fiscal cliffs and sequestration came into vogue. As
I explained last year . . .81
This short passage has it all: a contrast between the Court's long
time horizon ("nearly a decade ago") with the transient
"vogue[s]" of the elected branches; the obvious wisdom of the
Court's own approach (which "should be clear to all"); and the
resigned weariness of having to "explain[ I" it again, year after
year. In a recent appearance at a law school, Roberts again
explicitly chided the other branches: "They are not getting along
very well these days.. .. It's a period of real partisan rancor
that, I think, impedes their ability to carry out their functions." 82
By contrast, Roberts was at pains to insist that any perception
of partisanship in his own branch is inaccurate.8 3 Nor is Roberts

8 John Roberts, 2012 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (Dec. 31, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2012year-endreport.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/2AUA-SG9F.
8' John Roberts, 2013 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2013year-endreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VDH6-3CMT.
82
Brent Martin, Chief Justice Roberts: Scalia, Ginsburg Wouldn't Be Confirmed
Today, NEB. RADIO NETWORK (Sept. 19, 2014), available at http: /nebraskaradionetwork.
com/2014/09/19/chief-justice-roberts-scalia-ginsburg-wouldnt-be-confirmed-today-audio/,
archived at http://perma.cc/FBN6-4QX4.
83
See id. ("Roberts asserted strongly the court isn't partisan, divided into
Republicans and Democrats, though he conceded an intelligent lay observer of the
confirmation process might come to a different conclusion."); Jeff Zeleny, Chief Justice
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alone in contrasting judicial reasonableness with electoral bullheadedness: Justice Ginsburg recently expressed to Elle the
desire for "a more functional Congress." 84 It is hard to read
comments like these and not suspect, with Pam Karlan, that
"the Justices see the political process as perhaps irredeemably
flawed, [and] see the legislative process as an inferior substitute
for judicial analysis."8 5
More importantly, it is difficult to read these passages and
not see a Court that is striving to distance itself rhetorically
from the institutions of electoral politics. The differential
conceptions of corruption in Caperton and Citizens United
suggest that the courts are different from mere elected
politicians-after all, why else would they need to operate under
a wholly different standard of corruption? Moreover, the fact
that the Court required judges to operate under a stricter
conception of corruption than it allowed legislative and
executive officials to impose upon themselves not only held the
courts out as different, but also held them up as better, nobler,
purer, more ermined. 86 The Court's rhetorical strategies of
presenting itself as eternal, passive, and exercising maturity of
judgment, as opposed to the transient, grasping, and foolish

Roberts: Justices Scalia, Ginsburg Wouldn't Be Confirmed Today, ABC NEWS THE NOTE
(Sept. 19, 2014), available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/09/chief-justiceroberts-justices-scalia-ginsburg-wouldnt-be-confirmed-today/, archived at http:Ilperma.
cc/PJ9B-RRPJ ("He said that he fears Americans will see the Supreme Court as a
'political entity.' 'I worry about people having that perception, because it's not an
accurate one about how we do our work,' Roberts said. 'It's important for us to make that
as clear as we can to the public."').
* Jessica Weisberg, Reigning Supreme, ELLE, Oct. 2014, at 358, 359 ("[I]f we had a
more functional Congress, I think there would have been a big chance that Congress
would have amended the [Affordable Care Act] to say a for-profit employer has to provide
the same [health care] coverage as any employer."); id. (expressing a belief that the
country will move to a more progressive position on women's rights "when we have a
more functioning Congress"). For my own take on supposed dysfunction in the elected
branches, see Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2065 (2013).
8
Karlan, supra note 34, at 65-66 (internal footnote omitted).
86 The ermine became the symbol of Anglo-American judges because of a
Renaissance myth that the creature "would rather die than soil its pristine white coat."
Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive JudicialPolitics?, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 191, 192 (2012). Interestingly, the ermine is a kind of weasel, a creature with a
rather less august connotation. See D.A. Simms, North American Weasels: Resource
Utilization and Distribution, 57 CAN. J. ZOOLOGY 504, 504 (1979) ("Three species of
weasels inhabit North America; from smallest to largest they are the least weasel
(Mustelanivalis), the ermine (M. erminea), and the long-tailed weasel (M. frenata).").
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participants in electoral politics, serve to further distance itself
from them.
II.

"GOVERN"

To what end has the Court engaged in the distancing
maneuvers traced in the previous Part? Put simply, and the
Chief Justice's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, it
is to enhance the justices' role in governance. It is, of course, the
fact that the judiciary is part of the mechanism of governance in
nearly all substantive areas of law-whether that involves
making contested decisions about whether federal diversity
jurisdiction extends to suits against states by citizens of other
states,8 7 or about whether chattel slavery must exist in all
federal territories,88 or about whether schools may maintain de
jure segregation,8 9 or about whether abortion must be
permitted, 90 or about whether the entirety of a state's Medicaid
funding may be conditioned on participation in an expanded
Medicaid program. 9 1 More granularly, courts engage in detailed
and continuing oversight of institutions ranging from schools to
prisons. 92 These are all clearly governance decisions with clear
ideological valences, 93 and only someone with an implausibly
mechanical conception of the judicial role could possibly think
that judges are not governing when they make them. 94

8'

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).

88 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).

9 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
90 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-08 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J).
92 See Robert E. Easton, Note, The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 YALE
L.J. 1983, 1983-84 (1990) (listing a number of uses of structural injunctions).
9 Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1053-56 (2001) (describing the "revolution" in
constitutional doctrine wrought by the conservative Supreme Court majority in the
1990s).
94

See JUSTIN ZAREMBY, LEGAL REALISM AND AMERICAN LAW ch. 3 (2014). Note that

this does not entail the extreme legal realist thesis that judges always vote their
ideological preferences and then manipulate traditional legal materials to legitimate the
outcome and obscure the actual ratiodecidendi. It simply entails the much more modest
thesis that legal texts are almost always underdeterminate, leaving at least some room
for considerations extrinsic to the text. See Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstructionDistinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103-08 (2010).
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On very rare occasion, justices themselves are even willing
to admit this: in 1936, Justice Stone-dissenting, of coursewrote that "Courts are not the only agency of government that
must be assumed to have capacity to govern." 95 But this
reference to courts as an "agency of government," indeed as one
that "govern[s]," is highly unusual,9 6 and it has never been
quoted since in the United States Reports. Indeed, no federal
court at all has quoted that line in nearly forty years. 97 Much
more frequently, the Court makes every attempt to distance
itself rhetorically from this conclusion. Consider again the
Roberts quotation from McCutcheon with which this essay
began: not only does Roberts place the Court outside of "those
who govern," he also follows the Court's regular practice of
referring to the other two branches as "the Government," while
his institution is something else-the Court.98 It is important to
see through these rhetorical strategies-and all the more so in
the domain of election law. For if law is necessarily a form of
governance, then election-law decisions must be recursive: they
are the judicial acts governing the choice of who is to govern.
Consider Bush v. Gore.9 9 I know, that's a controversial
invitation. Justice Scalia, to take a well-known example, tells
questioners who raise the case to "get over it!"100 But it would be
so much easier to get over the past if it were truly past.101 Let us

9 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
* One early commentator regarded it as Stone's "most famous dictum." John P.
Frank, HarlanFiske Stone: An Estimate, 9 STAN. L. REV. 621, 622 (1957).
9
It was last quoted by a federal judge in Aspira of N. Y, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Y.,
423 F.Supp. 647, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). A Westlaw search turns up only one more recent
quotation of that line by any American judge-dissenting, of course. Tex. Workers'
Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61, 130 (Tex. App. 1993) (Peeples, J., dissenting).
98 In a similar vein, consider Justice Scalia's claim in McConnell that "We are
governed by Congress," and therefore that laws that limit our right to criticize members
of Congress (as, Scalia argued, campaign finance regulations do) "cut[ ] to the heart of
what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government."
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
99 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
o See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Editorial, Has Bush v. Gore Become the Case that Must
Not Be Named?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A18; Charles Lane, Once Again, Scalia's
the Talk of the Town, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at A2; Margaret Talbot, Supreme
Confidence, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40, 43; Jeffrey Toobin, Precedent and
Prologue, NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 2010, at 27, 27.
101
Cf. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951) ("The past is never dead.
It's not even past."). Given the ways in which election law is inextricably intertwined
with race in America, Faulker seems especially apt. See Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of
the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 190-91 (2013), available at http://www.
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stipulate that we will never know what would have happened
had the Supreme Court allowed the Florida recount to proceed
in December 2000. It is nevertheless true that the Supreme
Court's decision ensured that George W. Bush would be the
forty-third president. The Court, in a very real sense, "installed
a president," 102 even if some other mechanism might
subsequently have installed the same president. Indeed, as Jack
Balkin and Sandy Levinson noted less than a year later, "almost
all observers at the time believed" that the Florida recounts that
Bush v. Gore halted "would [have] put Al Gore ahead." 103
As Balkin and Levinson also noted (and decried), this
installation ensured that Bush would have the opportunity to
appoint federal judges. 104 And during his presidential campaign,
Bush had specifically mentioned Justices Scalia and Thomas as
models of the ideal Supreme Court nominee.10 5 Judges picked a
president who promised to nominate judges much like
themselves. It would require a nearly superhuman suspension of
disbelief to credit the justices' protestations that they put out of
their minds the partisan implications of Bush v. Gore.106 It takes
nearly as heroic an effort to believe that they never once
considered the implications for their Court or for the judiciary in
general of who won the presidential election. 0 7

&

yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-dignity-of-the-south, archived at http://perma.cclN7ZYQR75; Joel Heller, Faulkner's Voting Rights Act: The Sound and Fury of Section Five, 40
HOFSTRA L. REV. 929 (2012).
102 Balkin & Levinson, supra note
93, at 1045.
103 Id. at
1049.
104 Id. at 1053, 1060, 1083-84,
1086, 1107.
105 Fred Barnes, Bush Scalia, WKLY. STANDARD,
July 5, 1999, at 16; Neil A. Lewis
David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group's Role in Screening Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2001, at Al.
106 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 93,
at 1065 ("[T]he more the Justices offer
these protestations, the more unbelievable they seem. There is no reason to believe them
unless one credits the notion that members of the judiciary are almost altogether
different from other Americans who have succeeded in the political world and that they
have no agendas of their own or any desire to leave a 'legacy' in their decisions.")
(internal footnotes omitted).
107 It is regularly accepted as uncontroversial that judges consider the ideology of the
president when making decisions about when to retire from the bench. Indeed, some
judges do little to tamp down such considerations. See Robert Barnes, The Question
Facing Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Stay or Go?, WASH. POST MAG., Oct. 6, 2013, at 9
("Ginsburg understands politics but does not feel she faces a deadline to leave so that
Obama, whom she admires, can choose her successor. 'I think it's going to be another
Democratic president' after Obama, Ginsburg said. 'The Democrats do fine in
presidential elections; their problem is they can't get out the vote in the midterm
elections."'). If we readily accept that judges think about who will nominate their
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And, indeed, Bush was able to make a large number of
judicial appointments. In his first term, he had no Supreme
Court vacancies to fill, but he did appoint 168 district judges and
34 circuit judges.1 08 Obviously, his second term came with its
own (narrow) electoral mandate; still, the two are not neatly
separable: incumbency advantage is a potent force, 109 and
incumbency advantage may have applied with special vigor to
the man who happened to be president on September 11,
2001.110 Put differently, without a first term, Bush would not
have had a second one. And in that second term, he appointed
two Supreme Court justices (one of whom, John Roberts, had
worked as an attorney for the Bush campaign during the 2000
Florida recount1 11 ), 93 district judges, and 25 circuit judges.1 12 At
the time of Obama's inauguration, Republican appointees
constituted the majority of active judges on nine of the twelve
regional circuit courts, while Democratic appointees had a
majority on only the Ninth Circuit.1 13 As an admittedly crude
measure of how successful Bush was at appointing justices like
Scalia and Thomas, consider how frequently Roberts and Alito
have voted with Scalia and Thomas (and with each other) in
non-unanimous cases since arriving at the Court:

replacements, then surely we should also accept that, when installing a president, they
consider what this will mean for judicial appointments.
108
Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the
Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904-05 tbls. 1-2 (2005).
'09 See David R. Mayhew, Incumbency Advantage in U.S. PresidentialElections: The
HistoricalRecord, 123 POL. Scl. Q. 201 (2008); see also id. at 205-06 (citing other studies
coming to the same conclusion).
no For suggestions that this was the case, see Paul R. Abramson et al., Fear in the
Voting Booth: The 2004 Presidential Election, 29 POL. BEHAV. 197 (2007); Herbert F.
Weisberg & Dino P. Christenson, Changing Horses in Wartime? The 2004 Presidential
Election, 29 POL. BEHAV. 279 (2007). For a theory as to the mechanism behind this, see
Jennifer L. Merolla et al., Crisis, Charisma, and Consequences: Evidence from the 2004
U.S. PresidentialElection, 69 J. POL. 30 (2007).
n. Toobin, supranote 100, at 28.
112
Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush's Judicial Legacy: Mission Accomplished, 92
JUDICATURE 258, 258 (2009) (giving appointments numbers for the 110th Congress)
[hereinafter Goldman et al., Mission Accomplished]; Sheldon Goldman et al., Picking
Judges in a Time of Turmoil: W. Bush's Judiciary During the 109th Congress, 90
JUDICATURE 252, 273-74 (2007) (giving appointments numbers for the 109th Congress).
us See Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations in Obama's First
Term,

GOVERNANCE

STUDIES

AT

BROOKINGS,

16-17

(2012),

available

at

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/filespapers/2012/12/13%2judicial%20nomi
nations%20wheeler/13_obama judicial-wheeler.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3UKCLEW8.
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2005114
2006115
2007116
2008117
2009118
2010119
2011120

2012121
2013122
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Roberts
with
Scalia
78.6%
74.5%
67.9%
76.3%
58.0%
73.2%
71.4%
64.6%
54.1%

Roberts
with
Thomas
71.4%
68.0%
64.2%
66.1%
58.0%
64.3%
75.5%
62.5%
48.6%

Alito
with
Scalia
67.9%
63.5%
64.2%
72.9%
54.4%
57.9%
67.3%
40.4%
63.9%

Alito
with
Thomas
71.4%
62.7%
60.4%
71.2%
55.9%
57.9%
67.3%
59.6%
66.7%

[ 2015
Roberts
with
Alito
88.9%
86.3%
75.0%
79.7%
73.5%
82.1%
77.6%
70.2%
50.0%

With two exceptions (out of forty-five total pairings), these
pairings are all 50 percent or above, and the median pairing
records agreement in just over two-thirds of the non-unanimous
cases that Term. By way of contrast, over the same period,
Roberts and Justice Ginsburg agreed in non-unanimous cases
between 23.7 percent and 59.4 percent of the time, and in only
two of those years did they agree in half or more of nonunanimous cases. 123 Alito and Ginsburg agreed in nonunanimous cases between 20.3 percent and 48.5 percent of the

114 The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-The Statistics, 120
HARV. L. REV. 372, 375 tbl.
I(B2) (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Statistics].
n1 The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 439 tbl.
I(B2) (2007).
116 The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 519 tbl.
I(B2) (2008).
117 The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-The Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 385 tbl.
I(B2) (2009) [hereinafter 2008 Statistics].
n1 The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 414 tbl.
I(B2) (2010) [hereinafter 2009 Statistics].
"
The Supreme Court, 2010 Term-The Statistics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 365 tbl.
I(B2) (2011).
120 The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-The Statistics, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 388, 391 tbl.
I(B2) (2012).
121
The Supreme Court, 2012 Term-The Statistics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 408, 411 tbl.
I(B2) (2013).
122
The Supreme Court, 2013 Term-The Statistics, 128 HARV. L. REV. 401, 404 tbl.
I(B2) (2014).
123 They agreed in 23.7 percent of cases in the 2008 Term; they agreed in 59.4
percent in the 2009 Term, and they agreed in 50.0 percent in the 2005 Term. 2008
Statistics, supra note 117, at 385 tbl. I(B2); 2009 Statistics, supra note 118, at 414 tbl.
I(B2); 2005 Statistics, supra note 114, at 375 tbl. I(B2).
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time. 124 Clearly, Bush was successful in appointing justices who
would, broadly, rule in a manner similar to his identified role
models. 125
The numbers given above suggest that, in cases across the
board, the majority in Bush v. Gore was able to ensure that the
courts would continue to be stocked with judges who ruled as
they did. In the sense in which all judicial decisions participate
in governance, these judges are obviously governing, and the
Bush v. Gore majority, by installing the president who
nominated the judges, was clearly playing a key role in deciding
who should govern. But the recursivity goes deeper: these very
judges, appointed by the president installed by the Court, would
themselves shape the political process going forward.
It is no secret that the current Republican coalition is
nearing the end of its life-literally. Republican voters are
increasingly elderly, white, and rural, in a country that is
increasingly nonwhite and urban. 126 In the last six presidential
They agreed in 20.3 percent of cases in the 2008 Term, and they agreed in 48.5
percent of cases in the 2009 Term. 2008 Statistics, supra note 117, at 385 tbl. I(B2); 2009
Statistics, supra note 118, at 414 tbl. I(B2).
121 One overview of the Bush Administration's record
with regard to judicial
appointments concluded that, "In sum, George W. Bush and his administration set out
with a vision for the judiciary and firm ideas of what the President wanted his judicial
legacy to be. In that respect . . . his successful placing on the bench two Supreme Court
justices, 59 appeals courts judges, and 261 district court judges, all lifetime appointees to
courts of general jurisdiction, truly constituted 'mission accomplished."' Goldman et al.,
Mission Accomplished, supra note 112, at 286.
126
See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political
System is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1170-71, 1185 (2014); Christopher Beam,
Into the Blue, SLATE, Dec. 21, 2010, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-and politics/politics/2010/12/intotheblue.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/
NES5-K72P; Dylan Scott, Political Demographic Trends Brighter for Democrats,
GOVERNING, Apr. 11, 2012, available at http://www.governing.com/blogs/politics/govpolitical-demographic-trends-brighter-for-democrats.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
GT49-DTTG; PartisanPolarizationSurges in Bush, Obama Years-Section 9: Trends in
124

Party Affiliation, PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (June 4, 2012),

available at http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/04/section-9-trends-in-party-affiliation/,
archived at http://perma.cc/UUB3-UMHQ. On race, see Alan I. Abramowitz, Beyond
2010: Demographic Change and the Future of the Republican Party, SABATO'S CRYSTAL
BALL, Mar. 11, 2010, available at http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/
aia2010031101/, archived at http://perma.cc/84VD-AS37; Frank Newport, Democrats
Racially Diverse; Republicans Mostly White, GALLUP (Feb. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-mostly-white
.aspx, archived at http://perma.cclWR8X-UMQA. On age, see Chris Cillizza, The GOP's
Young-People Problem, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2014, at A2; Millennials in Adulthood,
PEW RES.

CENTER: SOcIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, Mar.

7, 2014,

available at

archived
at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/,
http://perma.cc/5X9A-3YN5. On urbanity, see David Jarman, Democrats are from Cities,
Republicans are from
Exurbs, DAILY Kos, Feb. 9, 2014, available at
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elections, a Republican has won the nationwide popular vote
only once, in 2004.127 The Party's official postmortem of the 2012
election
recognized
the Party's growing
demographic
disadvantage,1 2 8
as
have
influential
conservative
commentators.1 2 9 Of course, the decline of the current
Republican coalition does not mean the death of the GOP as a
party. As parties have done in the past, it will adjust, adopting
new issues and putting forward new standard-bearers that are
more appealing to the new American demographic. This
adjustment is already visible in its newfound acceptance of-or,
what amounts to the same thing, its desire to change the
conversation away from-gay marriage and marijuana
decriminalization. But members of the outgoing Republican
coalition are not prepared to be too accommodating on too much,
and a number of moderate Republican incumbents have faced

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/02/09/1274795/-Democrats-are-from-cities-Republica
ns-are-from-exurbs, archived at http://perma.cc/7A3F-29JU. For a breakdown of the
2012 presidential electorate along a number of demographic lines, see U.S. Elections:
How Groups Voted in 2012, Roper Center Public Opinion Archives, available at
http: //www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted
-2012/html, archived at http://perma.cc/U5CY-KRLJ. Even in the 2014 midterm
elections, these patterns largely held, with turnout making most of the difference. See
Jocelyn Kiley, As GOP Celebrates Win, No Sign of Narrowing Gender, Age Gaps, PEW
RES. CENTER: FACTTANK (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/1 1/05/as-gop-celebrates-win-no-sign-of-narrowing-gender-age-gaps/,
archived
at http:I/perma.ccl93PK-VJSB; Ed Kilgore, What the Hell Happened to the Democratic
Vote?, TPM (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/what-the-hellhappened-to-the-democratic-vote, archived at http://perma.cclU787-KG2L. There is an
indication that some traditionally Democratic demographics shifted slightly towards the
Republicans in 2014, especially as against the 2012 electorate. See Philip Bump, The
2014 Electorate Wasn't Just Older and Whiter Than 2012. It Also Voted More
Republican, WASH. POST ONLINE, Nov. 5, 2014, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp2014/11/05/the-2014-electorate-wasnt-just-older-an
d-whiter-than-2012-it-also-voted-inore-republican/, archived at http://perma.cc/NT928FZT. If that shift intensifies in subsequent elections, it may be a sign that the
Republican Party has begun to move away from its reliance on an elderly, white, rural
base.
127
For some reasons that the 2004 election may have been exceptional, see
Abramson et al., supra note 110; Weisberg & Christenson, supra note 110; Merolla et al.,
supra note 110.
128 Report of the GOP Growth & Opportunity Project 7-8 (2013), available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/623752/rnc-report-growth-opportunity-book-2013
.pdf, archived at http://perma.ccZ6X9-G62W.
129
See, e.g., David Frum, Crashingthe Party: Why the GOP Must Modernize to Win,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2014, at 37, 37-39; Peter Wehner, Demographicsand the GOP,
COMMENTARY, Feb. 6, 2014, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/
2014/02/06/demographics-and-the-gop/, archived at https://perma.cc/9T6Y-TUAA.
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stiff primary challenges from more conservative candidates
since 2010.130

It is precisely that older coalition that is represented in the
judiciary. 131 After all, two current justices were appointed by
Ronald Reagan, and a third was appointed by George H.W.
Bush. It was not until after the Senate abolished the filibuster
for lower-court nominations in late-2013 that control of the
circuit courts began switching from Republicans to Democrats.
Indeed, as of the 2014 midterm elections, despite the fact that a
Democrat had been president for fourteen of the last twenty-two
years, Democrats still held a majority on only eight of the twelve
regional circuit courts. 132 Of the remaining four, two would shift
partisan orientation if the active judges appointed by Reagan
took senior status (which they are all eligible to do) and were
replaced by Obama. 133
It should not be surprising that any political coalition will
be likely to adopt positions that serve to maintain its hold on
power. This is not an accusation of bad faith or conscious selfdealing; it is simply a consequence of the human tendency
toward motivated reasoning-that is, reasoning that tends
toward a conclusion that has been chosen for reasons extrinsic to
the reasoning process itself. 134 To take one particularly relevant
To date, there have only been three major primary upsets: Joe Miller's defeat of
Senator Lisa Murkowski in the 2010 Senate primary in Alaska, Richard Mourdock's
defeat of Senator Richard Lugar in the 2012 Senate primary in Indiana, and David
Brat's defeat of House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in a 2014 House primary in Virginia.
But a number of non-incumbent establishment-favored candidates have lost to
conservative upstarts, and a number of centrist Republicans have suddenly developed
conservative fervor. See generally Dan Balz, Tea Party May Lose GOP Primary Battles,
But Has it Won the War?, WASH. POST, May 6, 2014, at A12.
1s1
See Balkin, supra note 126, at 1196 ("President Obama faces a court dominated
by the old regime. . . .").
132
See Al Kamen, Obama Judges Tip Appeals Courts to Democrats, WASH. POST
ONLINE, May 29, 2014, available at http: /www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-thearchived at http://
loop/wp/2014/05/29/obama-judges-tip-appeals-courts-to-democrats/,
perma.cc/MCU3-HYKF; Jeremy W. Peters, Building Legacy, Obama Reshapes Appellate
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2014, at Al.
133 Those are the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits would
remain Republican-controlled, even with such replacements.
134 As Dan Kahan defines it, motivated reasoning is:
130

the tendency of people to unconsciously process information-including
empirical data, oral and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory
perceptions-to promote goals or interests extrinsic to the decisionmaking task
at hand. When subject to it, individuals can be unwittingly disabled from
making dispassionate, open-minded, and fair judgments. Moreover, although
people are poor at detecting motivated reasoning in themselves, they can
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example, a recent experiment found that individuals tasked
with adjudicating ballot disputes were more likely to accept
challenges from co-partisans than from members of the other
party. 135 Individuals engaging in motivated reasoning do not
perceive themselves to be doing so; in fact, it is one of the
hallmarks of motivated reasoning that individuals "attempt to
be rational and to construct a justification of their desired
conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer .

.

.. In

136

other words, they maintain an 'illusion of objectivity."'
As
motivated reasoners come to perceive that there is more at
stake, the motivation to reach the desired outcome grows
stronger. Members of a coalition in decline may therefore feel
the strongest pull to reason toward results that maintain their
hold on power.
The judicial members of that coalition have recently taken
steps that-whatever the conscious motivations of the
individuals involved-have the likely effect of helping to
entrench Republicans in power. As the expiration of the Voting
Rights Act's section 5 preclearance provision in 2007
approached, a number of Republican elites began developing and
emphasizing a critique of preclearance. 13 7 Article after article
followed the same ritualistic formula: praise for the 1965 Act
itself ("the 20th century's noblest and most transformative law,"
as conservative columnist George Will put

itl38)

before going on

to celebrate its success in enfranchising racial minorities and
argue that its most vigorous provisions, especially section 5, are

readily discern its effect in others, in whom it is taken to manifest bias or bad
faith.
Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term-Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for ConstitutionalLaw, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7
(2011). See also Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480
(1990).
135 Kyle C. Kopko et al., In the Eye of the Beholder? Motivated Reasoning in Disputed
Elections, 33 POL. BEHAV. 271 (2011).
136
Kunda, supra note 134, at 482-83.
137 I do not mean to suggest that such criticism on the
right was new in 2005;
obviously, the Voting Rights Act has been contentious for its entire history, and, as Reva
Siegel has pointed out, "[hiostility to the Voting Rights Act flourished in the [Reagan]
Administration," where a young Justice Department official named John Roberts wrote
talking points against the Act. Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 TermForeword: EqualityDivided, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1, 72-73 (2013). But it is clearly the case
that elite conservative attacks on preclearance in particular picked up in both frequency
and intensity as the 2007 expiration date approached.
'3
George F. Will, VRA, All of It, Forever?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 10, 2005, at 70.

73]

GOVERNING AND DECIDING WHO GOVERNS

99

now therefore (again, in Will's words) "antiquarian nonsense." 139
The repeated reauthorizations of the preclearance requirement
are depicted as driven by self-interested Democrats (often
serving their civil-rights-activist puppetmasters) and acquiesced
in by cowardly Republicans. 140 As Abigail Thernstrom and
Edward Blum put it:
Will the GOP truly benefit politically from its craven
surrender to Jesse Jackson and other activists eager to
wave the racism flag? Not a chance .... Opposing the
civil-rights lobby requires political courage-a commodity
rarely seen in Washington. Many Republicans in
Congress understand the principles involved here, but
aren't willing to fight for them. Draconian federal
intrusion into local elections was justified when it was
the only way to enfranchise Southern blacks-but 40
years on, it's an unconstitutional travesty. 14 1

-

Some commentators, in an effort to demonstrate that they were
not motivated by partisanship, noted that the creation of
majority-minority districts had actually helped Republicans 142
although it was left unexplained why opposition to majorityminority districts entailed opposition to preclearance. This basic
formula was apparent in any number of articles in 2005 and
2006.143
In mid-2006, Congress voted overwhelmingly to reauthorize
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 144 Republicans controlled both
139

Id.

140

See id.
Abigail Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15,
2005, at AO.
142
See Will, supra note 138; Robert Robb, Strange Politics Will Stifle Debate on
Voting Rights Act, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2005, at B9.
143
In addition to the articles cited in supra notes 138-142, see, e.g., Editorial, End
Separate Rules for the South, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., June 26, 2006, at B8; John J.
Miller, Every Man's Burden, NAT'L REV., Apr. 10, 2006, at 22; J. Elbert Peters, House
GOP Was Right, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, June 26, 2006, at A8; Abigail Thernstrom
Edward Blum, After 40 Years, It's Time for Virginia to Move On..., RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2005, at All; Jim Wooten, Real Election Chicanery on the Other Foot,
ATL. J. & CONST., Aug. 9, 2005, at A9; Jim Wooten, Our Opinion: Much Ado about Voting
a PoliticalPloy, ATL. J. & CONST., July 2, 2006, at C8.
144
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 4, 120 Stat. 577,
580. The reauthorization was passed 390-33 in the House and 98-0 in the Senate and
signed into law by President Bush.
&
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houses of Congress and the presidency at the time. After initial
expressions of anger that Republicans in Congress had been
"cowed by racial demagoguery" 14 5 or had "flinched from the
political totem of race and voting," 146 the discourse shifted to a
constitutional register in anticipation of judicial challenges.
Responding to a particular denial of preclearance, Alabama
Attorney General Troy King wrote in 2007 that the "imperialism
of a federal preclearance system" implicated "[i]mportant
notions of federalism and states' rights." 147 Other conservative
commentators explicitly urged the Supreme Court to strike
down section 5.148 In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder (NAMUDNO),149 the Court avoided the
issue of the constitutionality of section 5, instead interpreting
the Act's provision for "bailing out" of the preclearance
requirement to be applicable to the utility district at issue. Chief
Justice Roberts' decision for the Court, however, began with a
lengthy discussion questioning the constitutionality of section 5,
before making the constitutional-avoidance pivot.150 The outlines

of that section will be familiar. It began with dutiful praise of
the Voting Rights Act: "The historic accomplishments of the
Voting Rights Act are undeniable." 15 1 But the Act's very success,
Roberts continued, may have undermined the case for its
continuing viability: "These improvements are no doubt due in
significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and stand as a
monument to its success. Past success alone, however, is not
145 Peter Kirsanow, Trumping the Race Card,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2007,
available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/219826/trumping-race-card-peterkirsanow, archived at http://perma.cc/2SJ3-BWKF.
146 Robert Robb, The Racism in Voting Rights: 1965
Act is Outdated and Outmoded,
but Who Dares Touch It? Not Congress, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 9, 2006, at B9.
147 Troy King, Feds Are Overreaching, Interfering: Ruling on Governor's
County
Appointment is Not About Juan Chastang or Minority Representation Anymore, PRESSREG. (Mobile, Ala.), May 13, 2007, at Dl.
148

See, e.g., Katharine Inglis Butler, Attention Supreme Court, AM. SPECTATOR

ONLINE, Apr. 23, 2009, available at http: //spectator.org/articles/41720/attentionsupreme-court, archived at http: /perma.cc/84F6-T6PL; Edward Blum, It Will Always Be
1965... to the Voting-Rights Activists, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 29, 2008, at 12, 14;
Edward Blum, Gerrymandering on Trial, AM. SPECTATOR ONLINE, Mar. 16, 2009,
available at http://spectator.org/articles/41965/gerrymandering-trial,
archived at
http://perma.cc/DC4J-GUP3; Abigail Thernstrom, Integration Now: The Supreme Court
Should Scrap an Antiquated and UnconstitutionalRule, NAT'L REV., June 22, 2009, at
32; George F. Will, Voting Rights Anachronism, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2009, at B7.
149 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
150 Id. at 201-06.
'5' Id. at 201.
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adequate
justification
to
retain
the
preclearance
requirements ... . [T]he Act imposes current burdens and must
be justified by current needs." 15 2 This dicta seemed intended to
telegraph that the Court was prepared to strike down section 5
in the future. 153
Although some conservatives were disappointed that the
Court pulled back from a constitutional ruling in NAMUDNO, 154
others were emboldened by Roberts' dicta and urged the Court
to complete the task.15 5 And four years later in Shelby County,
the Court, with Roberts writing for the five-justice majority,
struck down section 4's coverage formula, thereby effectively
gutting section 5's preclearance requirement. 156 Once again, the
Court's opinion began by praising the Act generally: "The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address
an extraordinary problem." 15 7 But, "[n]early 50 years later,
things have changed dramatically." 15 8 Although "[t]here is no
doubt that these improvements are in large part because of the
Voting Rights Act,"

59

the constitutionality of the preclearance

regime must be judged "in light of current conditions," not in
light of history. 16 0 And the fact that the preclearance formula
had not been updated meant that it could not be justified in
light of current conditions. 161
152

Id. at 202-03.

153 On the Roberts Court's practice of signaling its intentions in one case before
striking down a law in a subsequent case, see Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last
Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 173 (2014).
154 See, e.g., George F. Will, Will It Be 1972 Forever?: The High Court's Misplaced
Modesty, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 2009, at 30.
15s See, e.g., Charlotte Allen, Politicizing Justice: Attorney General Eric Holder's
Agenda Begins and Ends with Delivering Favors to Obarna's Constituencies, WKLY.
STANDARD, Feb. 25, 2013, at 20, 27; Roger Clegg, Voting Rights-And Wrongs: The
Elusive Quest for Racially Fair Elections by Abigail Thernstrom, 11 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS 123, 124-25 (2010) (book review) (hoping that "the
Justices will acknowledge that we are a different country today than we were in 1965,
and that the extraordinary displacement of traditional local sovereignty represented by
Section 5 is not only no longer needed, but violates the most fundamental federalism and
colorblind principles of the Constitution"); Abigail Thernstrom, The Demise of Section 5:
A Now-Irrelevant Provisionof the Voting Rights Act May Soon Be No More, NAT'L REV.,
Apr. 2, 2012, at 20.
156 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
157 Id. at 2618.
1ss Id. at 2625.

1

16
161

Id. at 2626.
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627.
Id. at 2627-30.
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But a puzzle remains: if the elimination of preclearance
truly was the conservative movement position, then how do we
explain the fact that the 2006 reauthorization was
overwhelmingly passed by two Republican-controlled chambers
and then signed into law by a Republican president? Justice
Scalia has a theory for us, which he offered during oral
arguments in Shelby County:
[T]his last enactment, not a single vote in the Senate
against it. And the House is pretty much the same. Now,
I don't think that's attributable to the fact that it is so
much clearer now that we need this. I think it is
attributable, very likely attributable, to a phenomenon
that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement. It's been
written about. Whenever a society adopts racial
entitlements, it is very difficult to get out of them
through the normal political processes.
I don't think there is anything to be gained by any
Senator to vote against continuation of this act. And I am
fairly confident it will be reenacted in perpetuity unlessunless a court can say it does not comport with the
Constitution ....

That's the-that's the concern that those of us who-who
have some questions about this statute have. It's-it's a
concern that this is not the kind of a question you can
leave to Congress .

.

..

[T]hey are going to lose votes if

they do not reenact the Voting Rights Act.
Even the name of it is wonderful: The Voting Rights Act.
Who is going to vote against that in the future? 162
This is a radical claim, indeed. So far from asserting that the
Court does not govern, Scalia argues in effect that the Court
must govern in this sphere, because members of Congress
cannot vote the way that they would like to. 16 3 The very fact of

162
Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013) (No. 12-96).
163 In this regard, Scalia seems to be taking as an
invitation Mark Graber's
observation that "mainstream politicians may facilitate judicial policymaking in part
because they have good reason to believe that the courts will announce those policies
they privately favor but cannot openly endorse without endangering their political
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near-unanimity is reason for the greatest suspicion: surely,
Republicans wanted to vote against the renewal, but they were
unable to do so, which clearly points toward some sort of
democratic malfunction, justifying judicial intervention. Of
course, the reason that Republicans were unable to vote the way
that (Scalia presumes that) they wanted to is because "they are
going to lose votes if they do." Democratic responsiveness is
presented as democratic malfunction. Judicial governance is
justified, then, not by the fact that Congress cannot do so, but
rather by the fact that the people themselves are incapable of
responsible self-government. We are, apparently, too in thrall to
racial entitlement. Accordingly, the Court stepped in and
thereby significantly
preclearance,
effectively eliminated
altering the process of determining who should govern.
In Shelby County, the position for which a number of
conservative elites had been strenuously advocating for nearly a
decade was thus brought to fruition by a five-to-four majority of
the Court, with two members of the majority being justices who
were appointed by the president who was installed by the Court
in Bush v. Gore. But the recursivity goes deeper: Shelby County
itself will significantly affect future elections in ways that make
Republican control of Congress and the presidency more likely.
Between 2010 and 2014, twenty-two states made it harder for
citizens to vote (these include laws tightening voter
identification requirements, laws making it harder to register to
vote, laws limiting the availability of early voting, and laws
making it harder for convicted felons to have their right to vote
restored). 164 Of those twenty-two states, fifteen had Republican
majorities in both houses of the state legislature (or, in the case
of Nebraska, the only house of the state legislature) plus a
Republican governor; two had Republican majorities in both
houses of the state legislature and overrode the veto of a
Democratic governor; two involved unilateral action by a
Republican governor; and one (Mississippi) involved a statewide
referendum in a Republican-dominated state. 165 Only in Illinois,

support." Mark A. Graber, The NonmajoritarianDifficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35, 43 (1993).
164 Wendy Weiser & Erik Opsal, The State of Voting in 2014, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, 1-4 (2014), available at http: lwww.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
analysis/State ofLVoting_2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J7V5-C727.
165 Id. at 2 &
n. 4.
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Rhode Island, and West Virginia was the process driven by
Democrats. 166
A number of those changes occurred in states that had
previously been subject to preclearance. In the immediate
aftermath of Shelby County, Texas and South Carolina moved to
implement photo ID laws that had previously been refused
preclearance; Mississippi moved to implement a photo ID law
that had been bottled up in the preclearance process; Alabama
moved to implement a photo ID law that passed in 2011 but had
never even been submitted for preclearance; and North Carolina
passed a sweeping law imposing a photo ID requirement, cutting
back on early voting, and reducing the voter-registration
window. 167 Virginia passed a strict photo ID law three months
before Shelby County that was never precleared but has now
been implemented. 168 Given the partisan makeup of the state
governments that created these impositions on the right to vote,
it should be no surprise that these provisions are most likely to
affect groups that tend to vote Democratic.16 9 Indeed, this is the
The numbers add up to twenty-three because Florida implemented some changes
through legislation and some by unilateral action of a Republican governor. Id. at 2 n. 4.
167 Tomas Lopez, Shelby County: One Year Later, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE, 23
(2014), available at http: lwww.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/
ShelbyCountyOneYearLater.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J9CX-Y9BP; Sarah
Childress, With Voting Rights Act Out, States Push Voter ID Laws, PBS FRONTLINE,
June
26,
2013,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-electionspolitics/with-voting-rights-act-out-states-push-voter-id-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/
AA56-VWY9.
168
Errin Whack, Virginia Voter ID Law Signed, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2013, at B1.
169 See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should
Think About
Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127
HARv. L. REV. F. 58, 63 (2014) ("Judged through a partisan lens then, North Carolina's
law is just the latest Republican attempt to skew the electorate at least moderately to
gain electoral advantage."); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 60 ("Republicans' political incentives point unambiguously toward
the enactment of additional franchise restrictions. Not surprisingly, in the brief period
that has elapsed since Shelby County was decided, officials in Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia already have announced their intention
to pass or implement photo ID laws and other similar measures."); Steven Yaccino
Lizette Alvarez, New G.O.P. Bid to Limit Voting in Swing States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2014, at Al ("Those most affected by the restrictions are minorities and the urban poor,
who tend to vote Democratic.").
Indeed, the only significant claim that provisions restricting the vote will not
redound to the Republicans' benefit sounds in backlash: Democratic voters most likely to
be disfranchised by such laws will be outraged and undertake the extra effort now
required to vote precisely because they understand these new restrictions to be aimed at
disempowering them. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County
and the Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 109, 134-36 (2013).
This raises an important point about all political action: results are never certain, and
&
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official litigation position of at least one state: in response to the
Department of Justice's allegation that its redistricting plan was
racially discriminatory, Texas recently argued that, "[iun 2011,
both houses of the Texas Legislature were controlled by large
Republican majorities, and their redistricting decisions were
designed to increase the Republican Party's electoral prospects
at the expense of the Democrats."1 7 0 Of the six states where
preclearance was formerly required that have passed voting
restrictions since Shelby County, two, North Carolina and
Virginia, are swing states, where small changes in the
composition of the electorate could determine state-wide
elections-including, of course, determining who gets the state's
electoral college votes and whom the state sends to the Senate,
which, in turn, determines who nominates and confirms judges.
And every state has at least some competitive legislative
districts and local elections, where such changes would also be
pivotal-including elections to state legislatures, many of which
will draw new district lines after the 2020 census, thus playing a
role in determining who governs even further into the future.
(Before Shelby County, redistricting plans in covered
jurisdictions would have required preclearance.)
Of course, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is not the only
game in town. Now the states that were formerly subject to
preclearance face the same legal landscape as the states that
were not-and many of those twenty-two states that enacted
barriers to voting had never been subject to section 5. But here,
too, Bush v. Gore continues to ramify. Consider the fate of North
Carolina's sweeping new election law: a federal district judge,
appointed by George W. Bush, denied a motion for a preliminary
171
A Fourth
injunction against the new voting restrictions.
Circuit panel, consisting of one Clinton appointee and two
Obama appointees, partially reversed, enjoining enforcement of
the law's elimination of same-day registration and its
unintended consequences abound. But even if the backlash thesis is correct-and the
evidence for it, thus far, is only anecdotal and circumstantial-it serves to reinforce,
rather than undermine, the partisan valence of the initial decision to implement voting
restrictions. After all, the backlash, if it exists, is against precisely that valence.
170
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(c)
of the Voting Rights Act at 19, Perez v. Texas, 970 F. Supp. 2d 593 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No.
5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/08/Texas-reply-on-Sec.-3-of-VRA-8-5-13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
252D-3E7V.
171 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
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prohibition on counting ballots cast in the wrong precinct, but
affirming the district court's denial of an injunction on other
provisions of the law. 172 The Supreme Court, with two
Democratic appointees dissenting, stayed the decision pending
appeal, thereby reinstating all of the provisions of the North
Carolina law in time for the 2014 election, which featured a
closely fought Senate race, among other things. 173 The
Republican candidate, Thom Tillis, narrowly won the Senate
race. 174 Or consider Texas's new photo ID law: in October 2014,
an Obama-appointed federal judge struck down the law, finding
that it violated both the Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act. 175 Three days later, a panel of the Fifth Circuit, comprised
of two George W. Bush appointees and one Obama appointee,
stayed the district court's decision pending appeal. 1 6 The
Supreme Court denied a motion to vacate the stay, with three of
the four Democratic appointees dissenting.1 7 In Ohio, a Clintonappointed district judge enjoined enforcement of a new statute
and regulations curtailing early voting. 178 A panel of the Sixth
Circuit, consisting of one Carter appointee (!) and two Clinton
appointees, denied a motion to stay the decision pending appeal
and subsequently affirmed the district court's decision.1 79 The
Supreme Court, with all four Democratic appointees dissenting,
stayed the district court's order granting the preliminary
injunction, thus allowing the reduction in early voting.180
In Wisconsin, where Republican Governor (and possible
2016 presidential candidate) Scott Walker was locked in a tough
reelection battle, 181 a Clinton-appointed district judge enjoined

172

League of Women Voters of N. Carolina v. N. Carolina, 769 F.3d 224
(4th Cir.

2014).
173
174

N. Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 6
(2014).
See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov.

5, 2014, at Al.

175 Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
176

Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014).

177 Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014).
Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 769 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2014)
(denying
stay pending appeal); Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir.
2014) (affirming the injunction).
"' Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).
181 For discussions of the national implications and importance of the 2014
Wisconsin gubernatorial race, see Noam Scheiber, Scott Walker's Race for Governor
178

179

Could Shape U.S. Politics for Years to Come, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Aug. 25, 2014,
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enforcement of the state's 2011 photo ID law.1 82 A Seventh
Circuit panel consisting of one Reagan appointee and two
George W. Bush appointees stayed the district court's order
pending appeal 83 and then reversed the district court a few
weeks later. 184 Judge Posner requested rehearing en banc; the
request was denied by an equally divided court, and all five
judges voting to deny rehearing were appointed by Republican
presidents. 8 5 Here, the Wisconsin story departs somewhat from
the others: the Supreme Court, with three Republican
appointees dissenting, vacated the Seventh Circuit's order and
restored the district court's injunction pending appeal.1 86
(Walker was, nevertheless, reelected. 187) It is possible that Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy were troubled by allowing
the Seventh Circuit's decision to go into effect so close to the
election' 88-although, of course, this does not explain why the
Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's stay of the Texas district court's
opinion. Whatever the reason for the particular outcome in the
Wisconsin case, court decisions allowed new restrictions on
voting to proceed in three of these four states (North Carolina,
Texas, and Ohio) in ways that certainly were perceived to be,
and likely were, beneficial to Republicans. And the party of the
appointing president turns out to be an excellent (although not
perfect) predictor of how judges voted in these cases. Judges
appointed by the president installed by the Court in Bush v.
Gore thus not only eliminated preclearance under the Voting

at
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119208/scott-walker-mary-burkeavailable
governor-race-may-shape-future-us-politics, archived at http://perma.cciZ2QP-Y2HU;
Betsy Woodruff, The Most Important Race in America, SLATE, Nov. 2, 2014, available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/politics/2014/11/scott-walker-s-re-electi
on-as-wisconsin-s-governor-whyrepublicans think.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
C8PG-RHYK.
182
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2014).
183
'84 Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
185 Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir.
2014).
Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014).
See Trip Gabriel, Republicans Hold the Top 2 Prizes in Governor Races, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at Al.
188 See Frank, 135 S. Ct. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting) (raising, but rejecting,
this as a
source of concern). For a broader discussion of the principle that courts should avoid
changes to election law immediately before an election, see Richard L. Hasen, Reining in
the Purcell Principle, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http: lssrn.com/abstract=2545676, archived at http: //perma.cc/FQ5W-GTPQ.
18
187
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Rights Act, they also allowed a number of new voting
restrictions to affect the 2014 midterm elections. 189
After the midterm elections were over, the Supreme Court
denied certiorariin the Wisconsin case, 190 allowing the Seventh
Circuit panel's decision upholding the photo ID requirement to
stand. That requirement will accordingly be in effect for the
2016 elections in Wisconsin. The Court also denied certiorariin
the North Carolina case, 19 1 which will have the effect of
maintaining the Fourth Circuit's partial injunction while the
district court conducts a trial. Because that trial is expected to
conclude long before the 2016 election, the Fourth Circuit's
injunction is unlikely to affect that election. 192 In the Texas case,
a Fifth Circuit panel consisting of one Clinton appointee, one
George W. Bush appointee, and one Obama appointee affirmed
the district court's conclusion that the photo ID law violated the
Voting Rights Act; 193 Texas has petitioned for rehearing en
banc.194 And the Ohio case ended in a settlement. 195 Meanwhile,
a number of Republican-dominated state legislatures are
pushing new voting restrictions in advance of the
2016 elections. 196
Although parties are, clearly, central to this analysis, my
point is not meant to be a partisan one. Democrats, too, have
developed ideological positions that serve their partisan
interests, and they, too, have pushed these interests through the
courts. Obviously, in the cases described above, the Democrats'
'89 For a very preliminary analysis of the ways in which the voting restrictions
might have affected the outcome in some states in 2014, see Wendy R. Weiser, How
Much of a Difference Did the New Voting Restrictions Make In Yesterday's Close Races?,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Nov. 5, 2014, available at http://www.brennancenter.

org/blog/how-much-difference-did-new-voting-restrictions- make-yesterdays-close-races,
archivedat http://perma.cc/R7UX-Q9S9.
'9
Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
'9' North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
192
See Assoc. Press, Justices Decline to Review Voting Law: N.C. Measure Faces
Court Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2015, at A6.
'
Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015).
a Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-41127), available at http://electionlawblog.org /wp-content/uploads/
veasey-en-banc-petition.pdf, archived at http: //perma.cc /4FM7-AGPR.
195 See Robert Higgs, Early Voting in Ohio Remains: Uniform Hours
Are Part of
Settlement, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 18, 2015, at Al.
'9
See Jamelle Bouie, The Next Attack on Voting Rights, SLATE, Feb. 25, 2015,
available
at
http: //www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/politics/2015/02/the_
nextrepublican attack on-votingright democrats should.fight-for-a.html,
archived
at http://perma.cc/65XR-QXJY.
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votes were just as predictable on a partisan basis as the
Republicans'. 197 Likewise, Democratic judges are predictable
opponents of felon-disfranchisement laws,1 98 a position that
would redound to their party's electoral benefit. If the analysis
above seems partisan, that is only because the Democrats have
not controlled the federal judiciary in recent history: Democratic
presidents have appointed only four justices since 1967,199 and
certainly at no point since Justice Rehnquist, the last of Richard
Nixon's four appointments, was confirmed in December 1971
would anyone say that Democrats had a working majority on the
Court. At whatever point that changes, then the governance
engaged in by the Court may come to have a different
partisan valence.
Bush v. Gore, then, was not so much a radical anomaly as it
was a particularly salient instance of a continuously occurring
phenomenon: those who govern were playing a central role in
helping to decide who should govern. Judges are part of the
system of governance, enmeshed in its partisan interactions,
and when they decide election-law cases, this subset of
governors is playing an integral role in deciding who should
govern. Bush v. Gore may present the unedifying spectacle of
justices voting in ways that are inconsistent with their broader
ideological outlooks so as to further their partisan interests, 200
but the prevalence of motivated reasoning should lead us to be
wary of so sharp a distinction between ideology and partisan
20 1
interests, especially in the recursive domain of election law.
197
Cf. YaccinO & Alvarez, supra note 169 ("As the battle over voting laws escalates,
Democrats are intensifying their own efforts to make voting more accessible. Richard L.
Hasen, an election law expert at the University of California, Irvine, said Democrats had
their own partisan agendas for doing so since an expanded electorate would benefit
mostly Democrats. 'It's not just out of the goodness of their own hearts they are doing
this,' he said.").
1s See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56, 86 (1974) (Marshall,
J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., and in part by Douglas, J.); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d
919, 921 (2d Cir. 1996) (five Republican-appointed judges voting to uphold felon
disfranchisement); id. at 934 (four Democratic-appointed judges plus one Ford appointee
voting to strike down felon disfranchisement).
199 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 93, at 1076 (noting that "Democrats did not have a
single Supreme Court nomination between 1967 and 1993"). Since 1993, they have had
four: Justice Ginsburg in 1993, Justice Breyer in 1994, Justice Sotomayor in 2009, and
Justice Kagan in 2010. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present- 789, SENATE.GOV,
available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm,
archived at http: //perma.cc/33V7-SNX4.
See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 93, at 1084-85 (making this claim).
200
201
Dan Kahan has suggested that the differential treatment of voter ID laws by
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Whatever other ideological functions it served-and I do not
doubt that there are others-the development of a conservative
critique of preclearance likely served Republican electoral ends.
The precise effects of Shelby County and various other electionlaw decisions may be harder to pin down than Bush v. Gore, and
this wispy veil of ignorance may make those decisions more
palatable, more law-like, but their influence on deciding who
governs is both real and broadly traceable.
CONCLUSION

One can certainly understand why the justices are so
invested in denying that they govern. If it were to be admitted,
then they would have to face questions about their warrant for
doing so. The warrant for members of Congress and the
president is that they were elected within the last two, four, or
six years, and if they wish to keep serving, they will have to face
the discipline of the ballot box again soon. 202 But Justice Scalia
was confirmed to the Supreme Court the week that Berlin's
"Take My Breath Away" (the love theme written for the movie
Top Gun) topped the pop charts, 203 and he need never face any
sort of democratic disciplining mechanism again. Given the
"trend in government that has developed in recent centuries,
called democracy," 204 he and his colleagues may well be wary of
inquiry into the warrant by which they govern.
The justices' rhetoric well serves that wariness. Their selfpresentation-their "we"-makes them out to be wholly
different from elected politicians. Where politicians are
transient and fickle, "we" are stable and eternal; where they are
Democratic and Republican judges is a result of culturally motivated reasoning rather
than conscious partisan motivation. Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology in" or "Cultural Cognition
of" Judging: What Difference Does it Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413 (2009). This seems
plausible to me, as well, but it does not change the predictable partisan valence of these
decisions.
202
Except, of course, for second-term presidents. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
203 Scalia was confirmed September 17, 1986. See BiographicalDirectory of Federal
Judges: Scalia, Antonin, FED. JUD. CENTER, available at http://www.fJe.gov
/public/home.nsflhisj, archived at http://perma.cclFE78-PMK2. "Take My Breath Away"
topped the charts for only one week, from September 13 to September 20, when it was
replaced with the far superior "Stuck With You" by Huey Lewis and the News. See
Billboard Charts Archive: The Hot 100-1986 Archive, BILLBOARD, available at
http://www.billboard.com/archive/charts/1986/hot-100, archivedat http://perma.cc/TC2JFFHZ.
204

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW

9 (1997).
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grasping and voracious, "we" are passive and contemplative; and
where they are headstrong and foolish, "we" are mature and
wise. The Court thereby stands apart, but also above, as by
holding judges to a higher, more pristine conception of
corruption than it applies to elected politicians. In case that is
not rhetorical distance enough, the justices also more pointedly
claim that they do not "govern." The government governs, and
the Court is at pains to make clear that it is not the government.
But, of course, by any reasonable understanding of the
words, the courts both govern and play a crucial role in deciding
who governs. Courts govern all the time, simply because that is
what it is to make decisions that control the actions and
interactions of others. 205 But the nature of election law is such as
to give governance in that field a recursive quality: Reagan picks
judges who pick George W. Bush, who picks judges who pick the
rules governing the elections of future pickers-of-judges. Of
course, it is nowhere near that simple-many more actors are
involved, and there are many more constraints on all of the
actors involved. Governance is always shared, and it is never
free-form. But it is no less governance for that.
There are good reasons to have courts involved, to some
degree, in the process of governance. 206 But the extent of their
role in governance can only sensibly be debated once we have
acknowledged that they are, in fact, governing. Roberts' claim
that "those who govern should be the last people to help decide
who should govern" 207 was a statement made in the service of
judicial power: other institutions' motives, he was telling us, are
suspect. Trust in the Court-the eternal, passive, wise,
uncorrupt Court-to resolve these hard matters for you. Failure
to see through these rhetorical distancing strategies tends
towards passive acceptance of such claims. We ought to be more
skeptical of our governors than that.

205
See 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 709 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "govern" as "[t]o
rule with authority, esp. with the authority of a sovereign; to direct and control the
actions and affairs of (a people, a state or its members), whether despotically or
constitutionally; to rule or regulate the affairs of (a body of men, corporation).").

206

See CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, supra note

49, at ch. 2 (arguing that courts are one component of a thick and normatively appealing
conception of representation).
207 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441-42 (2014) (plurality
opinion of Roberts, C.J.).

